Case Study on the Impact of Small Arms on War-affected Children

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Mozambique: The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers

by Sarah Aird, Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante

Introduction

The use of small arms and light weapons greatly intensified the ferocity of the Southern African country of Mozambique’s brutal 16-year civil war and caused numerous negative consequences for the country’s children in particular. The prevalence of small arms, in fact, enabled the pronounced participation of child soldiers in what eventually became more than a decade of armed struggle.

The negative impacts caused by the pervasive availability of small arms and light weapons and the consequent participation of children in the Mozambican war did not end with the 1992 peace agreement. Former child soldiers in Mozambique not only continue to experience severe physical and emotional trauma as a result of their combat experiences, but also are negatively...
impacted by the instability that continues to hamper the country’s development. These children’s experiences have devastating, long-term implications for Mozambican society, as their experiences inform their choices, opinions and perspectives as they grow into adulthood.

**Background and History of Mozambique’s Civil War**

Mozambique obtained independence from Portugal in 1975, after a long war of national liberation. The postcolonial government, led by the nationalist movement of FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) adopted a Marxist orientation and socialist development model, met with resistance from the rebel movement RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), resulting in a civil war starting in 1977, resulting in a civil war starting in 1977,

RENAMO’s attacks against development projects, infrastructure, farms, and entire villages, were characterized by acts of extreme cruelty. FRELIMO forces also attacked civilian populations and contributed to the country’s suffering.

Mozambique became increasingly dependent on foreign aid, causing the FRELIMO government to undertake far-reaching economic reforms and abandon its former Marxist-oriented policies in favor of political and economic liberalization. The government was incapable of imposing a military solution to the conflict, as its resources were depleted from years of war and RENAMO was unable to sustain its effort, as foreign support decreased following internal reforms in South Africa, which had been the backbone of RENAMO’s support. With this military impasse, the possibilities of a political solution gained strength. After several months of negotiations, a General Peace Agreement was signed in October 1992.

**Small Arms in Mozambique**

Small arms and light weapons were the most commonly used arms in the Mozambique conflict. Estimates of small arms imported during the civil war in Mozambique range from 500,000 to 6 million. Russia supplied the majority of weapons to FRELIMO, with China providing some additional weaponry. After the war, the official coordinating police agency, INTERPOL, reported that approximately 1.5 million AK-47s had been distributed to the civilian population during the course of the war. Others suggest that roughly six million AK-47s were in circulation in the immediate post war period. FRELIMO is known to have distributed tens of thousands of AK-47s to civilian militia units in 1982, few of which were ever returned. RENAMO received weapons from Rhodesia and South Africa. In the late 1980s, Kenya provided ammunition, and sources in Portugal, Germany, the United States and the Gulf States also provided weaponry. Much of RENAMO’s weaponry also consisted of re-circulated Chinese and Russian light weapons.

**The Impact of Small Arms on Mozambique’s Children**

The Mozambican conflict was one of the most brutal wars of its time. Its consequences for the civilian population were catastrophic – approximately one million people were killed, 60 percent of which were estimated to be children, one and a half million people became refugees.
and three million people were internally displaced.\textsuperscript{15} An estimated 600,000 children were deprived of regular education due to the destruction of approximately 2,500 primary schools\textsuperscript{16} (accounting for roughly 50 percent of Mozambique’s primary schools),\textsuperscript{17} and 22 secondary, and 36 boarding schools in rural areas.\textsuperscript{18} Medical facilities serving approximately five million people were destroyed throughout the country.\textsuperscript{19}

### The Use of Child Soldiers in Mozambique

An additional and specific adverse effect of small arms proliferation in Mozambique was the increased use of child soldiers. Most child soldiers in Mozambique’s civil war were boys, but girls participated as combatants as well, although estimates of their numbers vary. Females reportedly accounted for only 1.5 percent of all demobilized combatants,\textsuperscript{20} but at the 19 RENAMO bases to which the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance gained access in 1994, 40 percent of the 2000 children found at these sites were girls.\textsuperscript{21} Children’s duties during the war, under both FRELIMO and RENAMO control, covered a broad range of military activities, from serving as messengers, porters, spies, and cooks to participating as armed combatants and being used as sexual slaves.\textsuperscript{22}

Both FRELIMO and RENAMO forces abducted children to serve as child soldiers.\textsuperscript{23} RENAMO recruitment of children increased rather than abated over the years.\textsuperscript{24} Beginning in the late 1980s, RENAMO began to recruit much larger numbers of very young soldiers—some no more than six years old—eventually utilizing anywhere from 9,000 to 10,000 child soldiers.\textsuperscript{26} Little is known about FRELIMO indoctrination practices with child soldiers, but RENAMO transformed children into aggressive warriors by subjecting them to a brief period of terror and physical abuse—‘socializing’\textsuperscript{27} them into violence.\textsuperscript{28}

The trauma experienced by children who are compelled to kill is clear in the experience of a Mozambican child soldier forced to fight for RENAMO using small arms, “[RENAMO] took me to their base camp. Yes, I was with the bandits. I had a gun to kill. I killed people and soldiers. I didn’t like it. I killed. I killed.”\textsuperscript{29}

Altogether in Mozambique, more than a quarter of former soldiers in that country’s 16-year civil war were recruited when they were younger than 18.\textsuperscript{30} Almost 28 percent, 25,498 of the 92,881 officially demobilized soldiers in Mozambique were younger than 18 when recruited. Of these child soldiers, 4,678 were under 13 years when recruited, 6,289 were 14-15 years old, and 13,982 were 16-17 years old.\textsuperscript{31} Reports estimate approximately 16,500 of FRELIMO’s soldiers, or roughly 23 percent of its total forces, were child soldiers.\textsuperscript{32} Roughly 40 percent of RENAMO fighters were under the age of 17 at the time of demobilization.\textsuperscript{33}

Children were not only forcibly recruited in Mozambique’s civil war, some volunteered to serve with FRELIMO and RENAMO.\textsuperscript{34} One of the primary reasons why children joined armed groups voluntarily in Mozambique was socio-economic. Many youth joined the RENAMO forces after attempting to find work in nearby towns and returning, disenchanted, to the countryside with little hope of better employment there.\textsuperscript{35} Mozambican children also had personal reasons for wanting to fight in the civil war. Like adults, some child combatants participated in the war in order to satisfy their notions of social justice or to protect
their religious beliefs or cultural identity. Some child soldiers in Mozambique also sought revenge for the deaths of their relatives.

Children served not only FRELIMO and RENAMO forces but also joined pro-government militias in Mozambique. Estimated to number 155,000, government militias were scattered across the rural areas, often only nominally under the authority of district or provincial officials.  

**Lasting Effects of War and Small Arms**

Many of the child soldiers who survived the Mozambican conflict suffer permanent physical disabilities as a result of landmines or bullets. Child soldiers in Mozambique were routinely supplied with drugs, including tranquillisers and alcohol, before being forced into violent activities. As a result, some of these children became addicted to such substances, while others may have been permanently affected by ingesting them.

Sexually transmitted diseases also are common among former child soldiers in Mozambique. By the end of 1996, an estimated 985,000 people aged 15-49 were HIV positive in Mozambique. The provinces most affected by the spread of this disease include those that had been used as bases for large concentrations of troops.

Former child soldiers in Mozambique’s civil war continue to suffer a variety of emotional difficulties. Former child soldiers from Mozambique have typically expressed extreme pessimism regarding their future, feelings of isolation and depression, high levels of aggression, apathy, introversion, various phobias, a lack of adequate mechanisms to solve conflicts, and a limited capacity to accept frustration. Psychotherapists also have noted disturbances in secondary capacities of intelligence, such as concentration, memory, and intellectual flexibility. In essence, normal intellectual development in these children has been inhibited. Some former child soldiers suffer psychosomatic disturbances, such as constant exhaustion, dizziness, sleep disorders, frequent headaches, and stomach pain.

In addition to the aforementioned symptoms, child victims of sexual abuse suffered additional emotional trauma as well. For the most part, the abducted girls who survived the war were those used as sexual slaves by their military rapists. Victims of sexual abuse typically try to conceal their experiences, because they have been socialized to feel guilt and disgrace. They often experienced rape not only as a personal shame, but also as a mark of shame for their entire family. If their sexual abuse becomes public knowledge, it is used against them; instead of expressing sympathy, community members often refer to these abused children as prostitutes.

As with other war-affected children, many former child soldiers in Mozambique harbor feelings of fear and anger toward anyone holding a position of authority, rebel against adults and adult rules, and engage in juvenile delinquency. Among a sample of Mozambican boys, researchers found that the length of time spent in RENAMO base camps, rather than direct involvement in violence, was a factor in their later capacity to act upon traditional concepts of right and wrong.

Researchers found that the length of time spent in base camps was a factor in former child soldiers’ later capacity to act upon traditional concepts of right and wrong.
implement an effective and well-funded demobilization and reintegration policy, particularly in the light of Mozambique’s high levels of poverty and underdevelopment.” Former child soldiers are responsible for at least some of the armed banditry. As one soldier explained, “We make money by selling guns from the arsenals. Some of our people also engage in banditry to get extras. It’s a way to survive….”

**Disarmament**

In November 1999, Mozambique still had an estimated 10 million small arms dispersed among a population of only 15 million. At the end of the conflict, both the FRELIMO and RENAMO forces impeded the collection and destruction of small arms. Commanders ordered their soldiers to hide their weapons as insurance in case the peace broke down. Even without much prodding, many soldiers were not keen on surrendering their high quality arms. As a FRELIMO soldier explained: “We knew that guns make good business. So we kept the best for ourselves…. FRELIMO was never going to pay us for the years we were made to fight. We have to look after ourselves.”

RENAMO soldiers held similar views, one noting that, “Guns can mean food. Before the elections we saw that we were being betrayed…. Why give up the guns…? We handed in the bad ones. Business is good with a gun.”

Although an official UN disarmament process was deployed, the UN did not destroy the bulk of weapons it collected and, due to an overall lack of cooperation by armed forces, many small arms caches remained hidden. Recognizing the limited success of the UN disarmament, Mozambican churches enacted a program designed to provide incentives for people to turn over their weapons. Rather than offering cash for the weapons, churches exchanged tools, sewing machines, and other practical items. Through this program, the churches collected and destroyed over 100,000 weapons.

But the efforts of the churches also have not been enough to disarm Mozambican society. The director of a firm that clears landmines noted that the dangers posed by massive arms caches in Mozambique represent an even bigger threat than landmines “[n]ot necessarily for renewed war, but there are plenty of guns to keep and thousands of rounds of ammunition to keep criminals…in business for decades. We are finding arms caches all the time…I am amazed that the UN didn’t have these shown to it or hadn’t destroyed them if they did. The weapons and ammunition around here are a time bomb.”

**Demobilization**

From 1993-1994, more than 90,000 government and RENAMO soldiers were demobilized. Even though more than a quarter of all soldiers in Mozambique were child recruits, during demobilization neither party admitted to having child soldiers in their ranks, and, as a result, they were not included in the formal demobilization process. Former child soldiers returned to civilian life with virtually no support of any kind. The lack of recognition of former child soldiers has had significant societal repercussions.

One unforeseen consequence of failing to demobilize child soldiers has been to put them at risk for military conscription. In 1997, Mozambique’s parliament passed a controversial law on military service. All Mozambican citizens between the ages of 18 and 35 became subject to compulsory military service. Due to this new regulation, many former child soldiers became eligible for military conscription. To prevent the conscription of former child soldiers, child advocate organizations developed screening processes in order to weed out former child combatants. However, it remained difficult for former child soldiers to prove their earlier service because they were never formally recognized and demobilized.

**Reintegration**

Because former child soldiers in Mozambique were, for the most part, excluded from
official reintegration programs, they generally had a difficult time readjusting to civilian life. A few NGOs tried to fill this gap by creating their own reintegration programs focusing on child soldiers, but often, these programs were insufficient to meet the needs of the vast majority of former child soldiers.

Many former child combatants returned to their communities after the war as young adults with no formal education. Those who had missed many years of education but were still of school age should have registered for primary school upon returning to civilian life. For many the appropriate level upon their return was to register for the first grade, which was social embarrassment that prevented many former child soldiers from re-entering the education system. The Mozambican government recognized the educational needs of former child soldiers, but determined that, for those former child soldiers beyond school age, developing educational programs for them were beyond the scope of the Ministry of Education. The government has encouraged civil society to develop such initiatives.

Another difficulty many former child soldiers faced was having to unlearn the expectation that all their needs could be immediately satisfied. During the war, child soldiers had learned to live in the moment, utilizing arms to get what they wanted, and many no longer possessed a sense of future orientation or appreciation for delayed gratification. This made returning home and participating in traditional agricultural work difficult. The prospect of securing food needs through agricultural labor required more future orientation than most former child soldiers possessed at the time.

This shift in attitude, as well as limited educational and work opportunities, led some former child soldiers to turn to crime after the war. Employers have tended to perceive ex-combatants as potentially violent people likely to disrupt the workplace and so were reticent to hire them, exacerbating the already difficult process of acquiring work after the war. Alfredo, a 19-year-old former child soldier elaborated: “There is no work for me. I have few skills except using a gun and it’s easy money… I used to be FRELIMO, then joined RENAMO, then joined FRELIMO. I have played war for both. Now I work for myself and my group… We try not to kill people, but accidents can happen during confusion.” Another young man, Joao, explained how armed crime was one of the few ways to make ends meet after the war: “What is there for people like me to do? A gun gives me a job! My family struggle on the land and they can’t feed me. I need to help them. The police use guns all the time to make money. So can I! Everything around here is about money…. So I make money with a gun.”

The official reintegration scheme for demobilized soldiers in Mozambique included cash payments, vocational training, promotion of small-scale economic activities, and credit facilities. Since child soldiers were ignored in this process, however, they did not enjoy these benefits. Rather, many found themselves in circumstances like those of Alfredo and Joao: without external support, reliant on attitudes developed during the war that proved inappropriate in a context of peace, and stigmatised due to their past. Without vocational training, job opportunities, and psychological services, former child soldiers in Mozambique have continued to suffer.

Reintegration programs were slow to respond to the needs of former girl soldiers. The presence and needs of girl soldiers were not systematically assessed in a way that reflected their multiple roles in serving armies – as fighters, cooks, messengers, spies, workers, or sexual abductees. Nor were the health and psychological implications of such experiences taken into account. The fact that sexually abused girls risked rejection by their families and communities made them reluctant to speak about their experiences. In addition, when former girl soldiers have had access to reintegration
programs, these programs have often reinforced gender-based roles, training them in skills traditionally associated with women. Often this approach has proved inadequate as these traditional jobs do not always provide sustainable self-employment and offer few economic opportunities for growth.

In light of gaps in the official reintegration process, a number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental reintegration programs were specifically established to address the needs of child soldiers. A Mozambican nongovernmental organization called Rebuilding Hope was founded in December 1996 for just this purpose. Recognizing that psychological healing is necessary for the successful reintegration of former child soldiers into communities, Rebuilding Hope focuses on two kinds of initiatives in its work: psychotherapy and the promotion of income-generating family and community-based activities. The organization cooperates with traditional healers and religious and community leaders in these efforts, encountering success in its approach.

Propaz is an organization that arose in 1995 from two associations in Mozambique working with former combatants: the Demobilised Soldiers Association and the Disabled Veterans Association. These organizations saw a need for conflict resolution in communities where former child soldiers were experiencing personal problems affecting the entire community. Propaz worked with these communities and with former child soldiers, establishing small groups consisting equally of members from both political parties. Once these groups were formed, Propaz implemented leadership training. In this manner, such groups have been able to solve, collectively, many community problems, such as the location of planted landmine and hidden caches of small arms. Former child soldiers that have played a role in such activities are no longer violent, having developed alternative conflict resolution mechanisms, and some have even become community leaders.

Some international reintegration efforts have proved successful as well. For example, after negotiating the release of approximately 850 former child soldiers from 19 RENAMO military bases, UNICEF, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross and Save the Children USA, established a reunification and reintegration program for these children. By December 1994, all of the 850 registered children had been reunified with their families. As follow-up to the reunification, UNICEF and the Mozambique Ministry of Social Welfare organized Home Visiting programmes so social workers could monitor the children’s social reintegration and identify areas of concern. The results of these efforts have been encouraging, as these children have received trauma counseling, basic education services, and technical apprenticeships.

Despite such success stories, there are areas of the country in which no rehabilitation programs exist. Rehabilitation organizations, which are generally resource poor, can only meet the needs of a small group of people. Therefore, thousands of people affected by the war have never enjoyed access to the benefits provided by such programs. Economic strain and natural disasters, such as continued flooding, continue to hamper the ability of Mozambican civil society and the government to address the needs of war-affected youth and former child soldiers.
Conclusion

The lasting social cost associated with the prevalence of small arms and light weapons is obvious in Mozambique. While Mozambique struggles to reintegrate its young people, it remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with a per capita income of about $90 and an average life expectancy of 38 years. Access to formal education remains hampered and almost 60 percent of Mozambique’s population remains illiterate today. In addition to the internal development challenges, Mozambique carries a debt of $4.8 billion to other countries. Without resources dedicated to the rebuilding of Mozambican society, children will not have adequate access to education and healthcare in the near future. It will take years to undo the damage wrought by small arms in Mozambique, but with commitment, it can be done.

Endnotes


3 Although it is impossible to determine the exact number of small arms utilized by both sides, some indication may be derived from figures based on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which was established, in part, for the purpose of disarming both groups and collecting and destroying their weaponry. It must be noted, first however, that ONUMOZ failed to bring about meaningful disarmament. At the end of ONUMOZ’s mandate, it had examined 498 government arms caches (98 percent of the government’s declared locations) but only 116 of RENAMO’s arms caches (only 40 percent of RENAMO’s declared sites). UN officials admitted that many more weapons remained in circulation as most were not necessarily reported to ONUMOZ, and ONUMOZ made no effort to seek out hidden, undeclared caches. Based on these reports, the following figures are believed to be significant underestimates of the number of weapons available and utilized during the war. Nevertheless, among the weapons ONUMOZ collected were 46,193 arms of various types, 2,703,733 rounds of ammunition, 19,047 mines, 5,687 kilograms of explosives, and 4,997 individual grenades. As part of the demobilization of troops from both sides of the war, an additional 12,736 FRELIMO and another 43,491 RENAMO arms also were recovered. See Alex Vines, “The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique,” Basic Papers, Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, No. 25, April 1998. [article on-line]; available from http://www.iansa.org/documents/research/res_archive/r13.htm; accessed 4 April 2001.


12 UNICEF estimated that by 1988 almost 250,000 Mozambican children had been orphaned or separated from their families and suffered from psychological and physical traumas. See Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention,” paper to be published, received by Laura Barnitz via email 26 March 2001; Alcinda Honwana, “Children of War: Understanding War and War Cleansing in Mozambique and Angola,” [article on-line]; available from http://cas.uchicago.edu/african/papers/honwana.htm; accessed 8 April 2001. Many of these children had witnessed the death of their parents and family, had been forcibly displaced from their homes in search of secure shelter, and had been subjected to various forms of abuse, including kidnappings and sexual violence. See Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention,” paper to be published, received by Laura Barnitz via email 26 March 2001.


14 Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention.”
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.


18 Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention.”


27 This ‘socialization’ included physical abuse and humiliation, punishment for displaying feelings sympathetic to victims, exposure to violence, drills and exercises, forced participation in killings, and formal initiation rites. (Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford University Press, Inc. New York: 1994) 93, referencing See Neil Boothby, Peter Upton, Abubacar Sultan, “Boy Soldiers of Mozambique,” Refugee Children, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, March 1992, 4-5.) Observes described how these child combatants often appeared to have undergone trauma and deprivation, were sometimes forced into drug-induced states, and seemed to have been programmed to feel little fear or revulsion for the massacres which, he reported, they carried out with greater enthusiasm and brutality than adults. (Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,1994) 26, referencing Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991) 95-96.)
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36 Ibid.

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43 Sally Baden, “Post-conflict Mozambique: Women’s special situation, issues and gender perspectives to be integrated into skills training and employment promotion.” 28.

44 Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention.”

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

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48 In Mozambique, child victims of sexual abuse were predominantly girls, although boys were sexually abused as well.

49 Boia Efraime Junior and Antoinette Errante, “Rebuilding Hope on Josina Machel Island: Towards a Culturally Mediated Model of Psychotherapeutic Intervention.”

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Children who had lived in the camps for fewer than six months overcame their distrust of adults, aggressive feelings and behaviours much more quickly than did those who had spent between one and two years in the camps. Only after three months in rehabilitation centre did the long-term camp residents begin to normalize emotionally, finally experiencing remorse for previous acts of violence. Guy Goodwin-Gill and Irene Chiao, *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1994) 110, referencing Neil Boothby, ‘Working in the War Zone: A Look at Psychological Theory and Practice from the Field,’ *Mind & Human Interaction*, vol. 2, No. 2, Virginia, 1999, 33.


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61 Ibid.


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